AI Attacks

Interactive tool

Red Team Plan Builder

Toggle the components and trust boundaries in the target architecture. The builder maps each to the offensive techniques it makes reachable, then assembles an ordered engagement checklist — per technique: objective, prerequisite, ordered test steps, success indicator, and severity — that you can copy as Markdown or download as JSON.

A technique is included only when at least one of its triggering components is present and at least one relevant trust boundary is crossed. The checklist is ordered by severity then prerequisite depth so you can run it top-to-bottom. Scoping aid for authorized testing only. 24 techniques · reviewed 2026-05.

Target architecture components

Toggle every component the system has.

Trust boundaries crossed

Which inputs are attacker-influenceable?

Full technique library

Technique Severity Triggered by component Needs boundary
Direct prompt injection / instruction override High system-prompt untrusted-user
Many-shot jailbreak High system-prompt, memory untrusted-user
Adversarial suffix (GCG-class) transfer High system-prompt untrusted-user
Indirect prompt injection via RAG corpus Critical rag untrusted-docs
Context-window poisoning High rag, memory, multi-agent untrusted-docs, untrusted-tools
Tool / function-call hijacking Critical tools untrusted-user, untrusted-docs, untrusted-tools
Data exfiltration via tool / link rendering Critical tools, web-fetch untrusted-docs, untrusted-tools
SSRF / internal-resource access via web fetch High web-fetch untrusted-user, untrusted-docs
Cross-agent handoff injection High multi-agent untrusted-user, untrusted-tools
Confused-deputy privilege escalation Critical tools, multi-agent untrusted-user, untrusted-docs
Visual / multimodal prompt injection High multimodal untrusted-user, untrusted-docs
Document-ingestion injection (email / file pipeline) Critical rag, multimodal untrusted-docs
Code-exec sandbox abuse / escape Critical code-exec untrusted-user, untrusted-docs
Persistent-memory poisoning (stored injection) High memory untrusted-user, untrusted-docs
RAG corpus / context extraction Medium rag untrusted-user
System-prompt & config extraction Medium system-prompt untrusted-user
Model / functionality extraction Medium system-prompt untrusted-user
Training-data / memorization extraction High system-prompt, rag untrusted-user
Model supply-chain compromise (poisoned weights / backdoor) Critical system-prompt, multimodal untrusted-tools
Third-party tool / plugin supply-chain abuse High tools, web-fetch untrusted-tools
Insecure output handling (stored/reflected XSS) High web-fetch, rag untrusted-user, untrusted-docs
Actionable-output abuse (auto-executed suggestions) High tools, code-exec untrusted-user, untrusted-docs
Resource exhaustion / cost amplification Medium tools, multi-agent, code-exec untrusted-user
Guardrail / classifier evasion Medium system-prompt, multimodal untrusted-user